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repulsewarrior
Deputy
Joined: 06 Jan 2006
Posts: 1603
Location: Canada
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...what really bothers me is the fact that by declaring a UDI, there exists a chance for many forms of lawlessness, and there is nothing really to stop the interlocutors from acts that are offensive to the rest of the world.
weakening the authority of the UN in my mind is irresponsible, and although I support the Kosovars in their efforts to sustain their distinction, this "Independance" is insupportable. |
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bg_turk
Deputy
Joined: 08 Oct 2005
Posts: 1315
Location: Bulgaria
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| Dream_Merchant wrote: |
The above picture of a 'Kosovar' boy speaks by itself.
The creation of a pseudo state called Kosovo makes no sense. |
It is not pseudo. It is recognized by the majority of EU states, and by the US, Canada, etc... Bulgaria, Hungary, and Croatia were the latest to recognize its independence.
When Montenegro declared independence from Serbia, Greece was among the first countries to recognize its independence. Why is Kosovo different? |
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bg_turk
Deputy
Joined: 08 Oct 2005
Posts: 1315
Location: Bulgaria
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| Dream_Merchant wrote: |
There are no Kosovars, there are Serbs and Albanians.
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And this from somebody who claims to be "Cypriot".  |
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cypezokyli
Ministerial
Joined: 20 Dec 2005
Posts: 2344
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since you pretend not to understand, i am giving you an article from le monde diplomatique..... (and imagine, there is even no mention of turkey  )
| Quote: |
independence for Kosovo: the domino effect
An end to Balkan national states
Kosovo is likely declare unilateral independence this month, to which the probable EU response will be an agreed statement accepting the change and allowing individual European countries to recognise Kosovo if they want to. The Serbian government intends to break off diplomatic relations with those who do. There are proposals to redraw the border maps, but another round of conflicting aspirations could cause worse chaos
By Jean-Arnault Dérens
When Kosovo declares independence, as seems likely, there will be serious consequences for the whole region. The Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina will regard the event as a precedent that confirms their own right to secede from a state that has never really functioned. Independence will also disrupt neighbouring states, especially Macedonia and Montenegro, and play havoc with the map of the Balkans.
Despite this prospect Balkan specialists and diplomats now suggest that it is time to break the taboo of untouchable borders. The conflicts of the 1990s were waged in the name of Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia, and Kosovo’s claims to independence raise the ghost of a Greater Albania. Has the time come to re-examine territorial grievances, and define new, fairer borders, more representative of ethnic geography? A lasting peace in the area may require a new map for the Balkans, indeed for Europe. The idea is not new, but it won’t go away.
During the troubles in Macedonia in 2001, the French writer Alexandre Adler called for “surgery rather than homeopathy” (1) and suggested the division of the post-Yugoslav republic into distinct Albanian and Macedonian regions. That year David Owen, co-chairman of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, also made proposals in Le Monde for redefining Balkan frontiers (2). These were echoed by a key figure in the Albanian nationalist movement in Macedonia, Arben Xhaferi, who called for the creation of “ethnic” states (3).
The failure of the negotiations on Kosovo’s future and the impossibility of an Albanian-Serbian compromise have resuscitated old ideas of partition, though this has long been considered taboo by the international community. Last August Germany’s Wolfgang Ischinger, the European Union’s envoy on the diplomatic troika leading the talks, said that any option capable of uniting the parties would have to be taken seriously; if Belgrade and Pristina could reach an agreement on the division of Kosovo – it hasn’t happened – the EU would have to endorse partition.
[b]The idea seems logical: if people do not want to live together, why not let them live separately, even if that means displacement as populations reshuffle to adjust borders to ethnic distribution in the area? Imagine that, by waving a wand, an international conference led to a peaceful agreement on new frontiers for the western Balkans, drawn up on lines of ethnicity.
Unite and truncate
Plans would need to be made to unite the areas with an Albanian majority – Albania, Kosovo, and the northwest part of Macedonia, as well as the Presevo Valley in the south of Serbia and the eastern fringes of Montenegro, around Vusanje and Ulcinj. (However, none of these redivisions of territory and people will deal with such practical matters as power generation and distribution, which will remain cross-border in many cases: the Serbian government has already threatened to cut electricity supplies should Kosovo become independent and is hardly likely to offer any resources to a Greater Albania.)
This would leave Macedonia truncated and barely recognisable as a state, unless the pro-Bulgarian lobby succeeded in attaching the country to its eastern neighbour. Then there would be the question of minorities in Albania: the Greeks in the south could claim attachment to Greece, while Albanians expelled from Epirus in the north of Greece after 1945 (Çamëria as it is known in Albania) would also stand up for their long-neglected rights. Montenegro could seek compensation in the Shkoder region where there are still Serbian-Montenegran minorities, and Macedonia could reclaim the Slav villages around Lakes Ohrid and Prespa.
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Serbs would return to their mother country. This would destroy Bosnia, especially if the Croats in western Herzegovina, central Bosnia and Bosanska Posavina (Orasje, Odzak) returned to Croatia. What remained would be a microstate, Muslim Bosniak, centred around Sarajevo, Zenica and Tuzla. This would be just like the famous plan to divide up Bosnia and Herzegovina devised in 1991 by Franjo Tudjman and Slobodan Milosevic (4). Bosnia would make efforts to defend the eastern enclave of Gorazde, and would claim the Sanjak of Novi Pazar, today shared between Serbia and Montenegro (5).
The state of Montenegro would no longer exist within its present borders. Apart from the secession of its Albanian and Bosniak regions, it would also be likely to lose its Serbian regions in the north. As Bosniaks and Serbs in this area are totally intermingled, a period of conflict would be inevitable, as the different communities reorganised and new borders took shape. Croatia would gain the Bay of Kotor, which has a long Catholic tradition and only became a part of Montenegro in 1918. Montenegro would soon find itself back at its mid-19th century borders, although it might have a hope of a maritime outlet at Budva.
Serbia’s position would be equally strange. Although it would have lost its Albanian and Bosniak regions, it would have gained Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Republika Srpska, as well as the Serbian areas in the north of Montenegro. It would also have to deal with Vojvodina. This autonomous region in the north of Serbia is home to some 20 different minorities, nearly 50% of the overall population. Its largest community is Hungarian (some 350,000) and the communes of Subotica, Senta and Kanjiza would return to Hungary, unless Vojvodina decided to declare independence and become the only island of multiethnicity remaining in the Balkans.
Countries within the EU would also be affected by the reorganisation. There are minorities in Greece, and not just the Albanians: the Muslims of western Thrace (Turks and Pomaks) would demand their return to Turkey and Bulgaria, cancelling the Lausanne treaty of 1923 (6). The issue of the Slav population in Greek Macedonia would also need attention, although this has always not been spoken about in the country. Slovenia would finally obtain satisfaction in its micro-territorial conflicts with Croatia (7). It would demand the cancellation of the 1918 plebiscites ( and expand its territory into Austria’s Carinthia where there are still a number of Slovenian communities. Slovenia could also be awarded a part of Italy’s Friuli, given the positive attitude it has shown in its management of the region’s conflicts – perhaps it would get the town of Gorizia (which is currently crossed by the border), or even Trieste (9).
This reorganisation would not satisfy everyone – the Gorani of Kosovo, the Ruthenians in eastern Croatia’s Slavonia, or the Aromanians in Macedonia, Albania and Greece. And the 3,000-4,000 Roma in the western Balkans would remain (as they have always been) a people without a state.
It is unlikely that such changes would come about peacefully. The emergence of armed conflicts of medium intensity seems more than probable and a regional task force would be required to command EU troops with a mandate to keep the peace. But population displacement could not be seen as collateral damage as it would be the whole point. The UN High Commission for Refugees would supervise the operation, assisted by NGOs. The emergency aid budget available for the western Balkans would have to surpass by far the funds raised after the Asian tsunami in December 2004.
Not so farfetched
This scenario may seem far-fetched but parts of the script have already been written, as far as Bosnia and Herzegovina or the Albanian nationality questions are concerned. The proponents of independence for Kosovo stress that it should not set a precedent; even so, it is inevitable that any solution to the issue will be seen as a precedent if those with a grievance, in the Balkans or elsewhere, feel they can use it as such. The main problem with the proposals submitted by the UN’s special envoy, Martti Ahtisaari, early in 2007 is that they detach the Kosovo issue from its regional context: there can be no lasting solution for the region if no mention is made of the Albanian communities in Macedonia or the south of Serbia.
The idea that nationality issues can be solved by rearranging borders is based on the illusion that borders can be accurately redefined along ethnic lines. All national borders are historical artefacts, the legacy of political and military manoeuvre. Borders are no more fair and accurate than they are natural.
The use of the term “Balkans” spread in the 19th century. As the Ottoman empire began to break up, the irreconcilable claims of its former subject peoples shook this region of Europe. The Balkans became synonymous with nationalist sentiment, complex conflict, upheaval and fragmentation – “balkanisation”. “The Balkans” was an ideological concept, not a geographical location. In this melting pot of cultures, contradictory claims and aspirations, border conflicts were bitter.
The emergence of states and the definition of their borders marked the entry of the Balkans into modern politics. The new states were generally nationalist, based on and adapted from the models provided by the specific history of western Europe. In the early 19th century Greece and Serbia established themselves through ethnic cleansing, organising the expulsion or assimilation of populations considered exogenous (on religious grounds: the Turks, meaning Muslims, whether Slav, Albanian or Turkish-speaking, were expelled from both states).
The definition of borders gave the impression that the confusion in the Balkans was being managed, that it could be transformed into a European ideal of order, based on the coincidence of a people, its national borders and the state. The diversity that had characterised the Ottoman era, the multiple identities of language, “nationality” and religion, began to fade.
The process accelerated during the wars in Yugoslavia in the 1990s: the Serbian population in Croatia dropped from 12% to about 4%, and the Bosnian mosaic was reorganised into broad mono-ethnic zones under the control of one of the three communities.
Remains of empire
In the 19th and 20th centuries Austria-Hungary and Russia, also France, Great Britain and Italy, battled to extend their zones of influence over what remained of the Ottoman empire. They supported and encouraged the national aspirations of the Balkan peoples. The politics of these states were relayed by journalists or travellers. In the 1930s the British writer Rebecca West chided the “humanitarians and philanthropists” supporting the nationalist causes (10).
There have been key moments in the definition of the borders since 1878. The “great Eastern crisis” was first settled with the Treaty of San Stefano, providing for the creation of a Great Bulgaria under Russian protectorate. The plans caused ructions in London, Paris and Vienna, neglecting as they did Serbia and Romania. They were reversed a few months later at the Congress of Berlin, when Austria-Hungary gained control over Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Sanjak of Novi Pazar.
The 1912-13 Balkan wars and the first world war are key episodes, too. In 1918 Serbia and Romania were handsomely rewarded for their fidelity to the Allies: the Serbian House of Kara-or-evi was able to proclaim the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later to become Yugoslavia), while Bucharest established Greater Romania.
Despite Wilsonian principles announced after the first world war, none of these states recognised the rights of the individual peoples to any autonomy. They enclosed a large number of communities within their new borders and transformed them into national minorities. In the 1920s the Comintern denounced the kingdom of Yugoslavia as a new “prison of the peoples”. It is true that the centralised state created by the Karadordevic bore little resemblance to the romantic dream of a unified state for the Slav peoples of the south (the Yugoslavs) (11).
The internal borders drawn up in 1945 for the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were the least bad of all compromises according to the principal politician responsible for them, the Montenegro-born dissident, Milovan Djilas. The system depended on maintaining a clear distinction between citizenship and nationality and had its origins in Austrian Marxist thinking (12). Yugoslavs were citizens of the federal republic in which they lived (and of the Socialist Federation), but they remained free to choose their national community: there was no obligation in the Yugoslav census.
The Balkan experience shows that the demands of the different peoples cannot be presented in terms of statehood without engendering strife and confrontation. In Kosovo there can be only two solutions to the mutually exclusive demands of those sharing the same territory: either the victory of one people over the other, with frustrations and quests for revenge, or the invention of new forms of political coexistence and co-sovereignty. The European context could surely generate new political opportunities capable of surpassing these territorial conflicts.
The great powers have always played an essential role in determining Balkan borders: Kosovo is now a pawn in the planetary battle between Russia and the United States, so little attention will be paid to the real interests of the Albanians, Serbs and others living in Kosovo.
Any attempt to settle the problems with new plans for partition would affect the whole of Europe. It is time for a better response than just redrawing lines on the map.
TRANSLATED BY ROBERT CORNER |
I ve told you before.... you have chosen certain nationalities that you dont like, and you just support anything ephemeral that seems to go against them.
when this process backfires dont say that there were not people warning against it. |
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repulsewarrior
Deputy
Joined: 06 Jan 2006
Posts: 1603
Location: Canada
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Dream_Merchant
Warnings : 1
Senior Villager
Joined: 19 Jun 2006
Posts: 421
Location: Limassol
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| bg_turk wrote: |
| Dream_Merchant wrote: |
The above picture of a 'Kosovar' boy speaks by itself.
The creation of a pseudo state called Kosovo makes no sense. |
It is not pseudo. It is recognized by the majority of EU states, and by the US, Canada, etc... Bulgaria, Hungary, and Croatia were the latest to recognize its independence.
When Montenegro declared independence from Serbia, Greece was among the first countries to recognize its independence. Why is Kosovo different? |
Because
(a) Montenegro has been a state or a self-governed region under foreign (mostly Turkish) conquest for the better part of the previous millenium. Hence it has the historical background to lean on.
(b) The people known as Montenegrins, even though sharing significant similarities, have been distinctly different from their neighbours.
(c) The secession process from the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro was conducted within a legal framework and in mutual agreement with all parties involved.
(d) The United Nations Security Council and in general all international bodies recognized and accepted the move for the partition of the Union. Both Serbia and Montenegro are full members of the UN and other international bodies.
On the other hand, and in contrast:
(a) Kosovo as a state has never existed within the meaning that the Albanians attribute and is only a very recent stillborn product of a non-UN approved international intervention.
(b) 'Kosovar' is a NATO invention of the 21st century to describe a fictive ethnicity that is nothing short or long of Albanian.
(c) the unilateral declaration of independence was neither conducted within a legal framework, nor with agreement (an agreement by definition being at least bilateral) with all parties involved.
(d) Neither the United Nations Security Council, nor any international bodies of significant stature, including the EU, have recognized the self declared state of Kosovo and it is highly doubtful that such a state would be entitled entry in the UN as a full member, or as a matter of fact, any other significant international union (EU, OSCE, Council of Europe, IMF, WTO, NATO etc etc etc)
Now if you still have problems seeing the differences, I suggest you first do more research and then attempt to present your arguments. And if you have trouble differentiating between the red Albanian flags and the (non-existent in the picture) blue Kosovo flags, then I suggest you see a physician for color blindness.
P.S. and on the note about Cypriot. The concept of a Cypriot 'ethnicity' is also a very new issue. Indeed, if asked 50 years ago, there where Greeks of Cyprus and Turks of Cyprus. There was no such thing as a 'Cypriot'. Nowadays one can safely say that there are Greek Cypriots, Greeks of Cyprus and Turks of Cyprus (and the extremely rare Turkish Cypriot). That's why I say that prior to 1960 union with Greece was the natural desire of the overwhelming majority of the majority of Cypriots, being of Greek ethnicity. |
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repulsewarrior
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Posts: 1603
Location: Canada
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