www.talkcyprus.org

[Dhavlos]

Should Cyprus have an Army??

If yes, why?(other than the obvious ' to protect national security' etc.) what are the implications of creating a balance between Turkish Cypriots/Greek Cypriots?

If not why? What other ways around this are there?

Should the police have a unit for 'national security' rather than an army?

Should Turkey/Greece have troops stationed on the island?

Should there be an international/EU force instead of a Cypriot Army? or to mix with it?

Should Cyprus be completely demilitarised?

What are your opinions?

[brother]

There should be no foreign armies and that includes Greece and Turkey, We should have a paid cypriot force for emergencies etc.

[cannedmoose]

Dhavlos, this is a security proposal I put forward in 'another place' some time ago... suffice to say I don't agree with the arguments that Cyprus should be completely demilitarised. What I outline is not the plan for an 'army' so to speak, but a national gendarmerie, mainly intended to maintain internal order, yet also operating as a paramilitary force, with the ability to provide an initial defence of the island in case of interference from outside (this incident involving Egyptian troops in 1978 is an example):

http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/february/19/newsid_2565000/2565701.stm

Given it's locale in a dangerous part of the world, I think the ability to defend the island, even for a short period from outside is necessary. Even countries such as Iceland, which have no military forces of their own, depend on the presence of external forces (in their case, the US) to maintain their defence and deter any potential attack on them.

I had some interesting feedback from others before, I look forward to yours... :D

Quote: 1. Security

(a) Establishment and maintenance of a joint Cyprus civil guard, trained by instructors from an impartial country, preferably either The Netherlands, France, Italy or Germany. The force would be limited to a manpower of 4,000 men. There would be no ethnic quota, although equal opportunities should exist for both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot participation in the force. Promotion will take place on the basis of merit and shall be decided by the Civil Guard commander, who shall be either Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot. The post of Civil Guard commander will, for a period of 3 years from enforcement of this agreement, be selected by the NATO council members and shall not be a member of the Greek or Turkish armed forces. After this 3 year period, the commander shall be selected by the Federal Government of Cyprus by unanimity. In the absence of unanimous agreement, the commander will be selected by the NATO council members pending an agreed candidate.

(b) This force would be comprised of combined Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot units, with English as the common language of communication, thus also facilitating integration into the system suggested in (h) below. Command orders would be required to be issued in English and recruits would receive intensive schooling in the English language upon entering the force.

(c) This force would function in a similar capacity to the Gendarmerie National in France, the Arma dei Carabinieri in Italy and the Koninklijke Marechaussée in the Netherlands - a limited paramilitary unit used to maintain public order and act in close support to regular military and police units.

(d) The Cypriot force would become a member of the European Gendarmerie Force, with regular exchanges between officers from the other five nations involved (France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain).

(e) Cyprus would become responsible for the protection and maintenance of its own sovereignty and indivisibility. However, in the event of internal strife, Cypriot sovereignty and indivisibility would be written into the NATO treaties, with the NATO Council as the formal guarantor of Cyprus security. A majority decision within the Council would be required for intervention, which would be aimed at restoration of the status quo and the resumption of peace talks within one calendar month of intervention.

(f) Interventions would only be permitted in the case of severe social unrest, foreign invasion or an environmental calamity and would require agreement by majority decision in the NATO council. No individual NATO member would have right of veto or interference in such operations (thus preventing a block from Greece, Turkey or any interested party). Similarly, no NATO member would carry the right of unilateral intervention.

(g) Interventions would preclude the involvement of Turkish or Greek combat units, other than medical and logistic support units. All NATO facilities in member countries would be open for use in interventions (thus permitting NATO forces to use Greek and Turkish facilities, without direct Greek or Turkish involvement in the operation).

(h) Cyprus would assume membership of the NATO alliance and the related European defence structures. In the absence of the collective security clause being invoked, the involvement of Cypriot forces outside Cyprus borders in NATO operations would be limited to the provision of medical, logistical and intelligence forces and would be subject to approval by the Cyprus government by majority vote.

(i) Within NATO SHAPE, the formation of a new Joint Forces Command – Nicosia would take place. This would assume responsibility for NATO command in the Eastern Mediterranean
incorporating Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. This Command would assume devolved responsibility from Joint Force Command – Naples. Joint Force Command headquarters would become located in the Federal Zone in Nicosia. In addition to assuming Joint Command over sea and airspace in the region, the Command would conduct joint annual exercises involving the forces of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus (as well as other invited NATO and non-NATO states). These exercises would take place in the airspace, seaspace and landspace of all three members of Joint Command – Nicosia, on a revolving basis (i.e. one year Turkey, next year Greece, next year Cyprus). Leadership of the command would rotate amongst the triumvirate every 2 years, with the Joint Force Commander reporting directly to Joint Force Commander - Naples.

(j) Other than in the Joint Force Commander HQ in Nicosia, no non-Cypriot NATO forces would be permanently stationed on the island. This does not preclude the participation of NATO forces in limited-time exercises to support the development of the Cypriot forces, particularly in areas such as border security, prevention of drug-trafficking, illegal immigration and peace-keeping activities.

(k) The Cypriot Civil Guard would not maintain or operate heavy weapons such as main battle tanks and heavy artillery and would be equipped with systems designed for domestic use only and incapable of sustained offensive operations. An international treaty governing weapons imports to Cyprus would be established to prevent import of any weapons that could be used outside these parameters.

(l) A Border Security unit, comprising 500 men, within the Civil Guard would be established and would be equipped with Coastguard vessels (permitted to carry self-defensive systems and heavy-calibre machine guns) and air surveillance drones and light helicopters (permitted to carry self-defensive systems and heavy-calibre machine guns).

(m) Most current military establishments would be disbanded and the land returned to civilian use. Where ex-base land is located within Constituent State (CS) territories, the CS authorities will assume ownership and will be responsible for disbursing. Where the land is located within Federal territories, the Federal Government will assume ownership and will be responsible for disbursing. Where land was previous owned by private individuals, the CS and Federal Governments will reserve the right of compulsory purchase if required.

(n) All remaining Turkish and Greek troops would be subject to immediate withdrawal and replaced by an interim Cyprus Stabilisation Force (CYSTFOR) of 8,000 comprising units from the European Gendarmerie Force and NATO. These would remain for a period of 3 years from the date of this agreement and would assume the functions assigned to the Cyprus Civil Guard throughout this period. As Cypriot Civil Guard units come on stream, these would interoperate with the EGF forces, gradually replaced them in operation zones until the EGF is able to retire completely (with a small number of trainers remaining on a rotational basis).

(o) All Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot military units would return to base, supervised by NATO observers, and the demobbing process would begin, with selection tests for those wishing to remain in the Civil Guard taking place during the first 12 months.

(p) NATO observers would also be responsible for the removal and/or decommissioning of all weapons not required by the Civil Guard units. This process would begin immediately. Where systems are of high-value, NATO forces would have first right of refusal on the purchase of these systems at current market value.

(q) The Sovereign Base Areas would be reduced in size, as prescribed in Annan V and the vacant land returned to civilian use. Sovereignty over the SBAs would be formally restored to the Cypriot government, although the UK would retain a 99-year leasehold on the territory from the date of any agreement. British forces would be free to come and go without restriction as to number or equipment (excluding nuclear forces).

(r) No new facilities would be established within the SBAs without the agreement of the Cyprus government. The upgrading of old facilities would be permitted so long as their nature is not changed (i.e. defensive systems could be replaced with more modern systems, yet should retain a similar range and be for defensive purposes only; runways could be repaved but not lengthened).

(s) Only British forces would be allowed to be permanently stationed in the SBAs. No NATO or other forces would be permitted to be permanently based in the SBAs. Visits by foreign forces to the SBAs would be subject to approval by both the NATO Council and the Cyprus government.

(t) Use of the SBAs in military operations would be subject to approval by the Cyprus government, excluding incidents of domestic strife requiring NATO intervention. In this case, NATO approval would be required.

(u) The British government shall inform the Cyprus government and NATO Council of any exercises taking place within the SBA territory or in the airspace or seaspace around, giving at least 48hrs notice. British exercises shall take place within prescribed boundaries in the territorial waters and airspace of Cyprus

(v) Current facilities outside the SBA areas would be retained on a permanent rolling 50 year lease from the Cyprus government. Cyprus will become a member of the ECHELON network, with the information gained from these facilities shared amongst its members. Should the Cypriot authorities violate the confidentiality of ECHELON, the sharing of information will cease with the permanent lease remaining in force. Upgrading of these facilities will be permitted, but they will be operated by a limited number of British troops only, no other forces will be permitted to operate in these areas.

(w) The 1960 Treaty of Guarantee would be abolished, including the sections describing the rights of British forces outside the SBAs. British forces would no longer have immediate right of use of international ports, airports and the road networks linking the bases without the consent of the Cyprus government and NATO.

(x) Movement of units between the SBAs of larger than 100 men, or comprising heavy weapons between bases would be subject to 48hrs notice given to both the Cyprus government and the NATO Council. These movements would be escorted by observers from the Civil Guard.

2. Related Implementation guarantees

(a) Turkish and Greek forces will begin immediate withdrawal from the island, monitored and supervised by members of the CYSTFOR. CYSTFOR will be responsible for the maintenance of order in areas vacated by these forces. Full force withdrawal shall take place within 3 months of the operation of this agreement, according to a timetable established by NATO Joint Command - Naples. Any forces unable to carry out immediate withdrawal shall return to prescribed base areas (at least 10km distant from the CS boundaries), subject to monitoring by CYSTFOR.

(b) Failure of Turkish and Greek forces to withdraw according to the established timetable will result in temporary suspension of their membership of the political section of the NATO alliance, pending compliance.

(c) Failure of Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot forces to withdraw in accordance with this agreement will result in the immediate confiscation of all weapons systems and immediate exclusion from the selection process for the Cyprus Civil Guard.

[magikthrill]

so are you implying a japanese-like army then?

[Crash Test Dummy]

sounds great but the invasion of cyprus was illegal in the first place and nobody stopped it why would they stop something like this again?

also how would cyprus pay for vessels and light helicopters?

[cannedmoose]

magikthrill wrote: so are you implying a japanese-like army then?

Even less than that. The Japanese have a pretty high-spec armed forces, they just call them a self-defence force.

What I'm talking about is a professional, small scale, yet highly mobile force that operates like the French Gendarmerie. Designed primarily to deal with internal crises, natural disasters etc., but able to also provide a limited defence for the nation. The real key to Cyprus' external security would be its membership of NATO, which means it would be incorporated into the NATO doctrine of an attack on one is an attack on all.

[cannedmoose]

Giorgio wrote: sounds great but the invasion of cyprus was illegal in the first place and nobody stopped it why would they stop something like this again?

also how would cyprus pay for vessels and light helicopters?

As I just said to Thrill, integration into NATO would be the real deterrent factor for any potential external aggressor. As for how Cyprus would pay for coastguard vessel and light helicopters, how much do you think Cyprus currently spends on tanks, artillery etc. etc.

With the peace dividend that would come from not having to maintain a large, conscripted armed force, with the additional costs of training, feeding and equipping novices, much money would be saved and it would also be enough to maintain a small, yet highly effective professional force.

[Dhavlos]

this sounds like a really good idea, well thought out and i can not really see any problem with it.

the only question i would have is over point (e)

Quote: Cyprus would become responsible for the protection and maintenance of its own sovereignty and indivisibility. However, in the event of internal strife, Cypriot sovereignty and indivisibility would be written into the NATO treaties, with the NATO Council as the formal guarantor of Cyprus security. A majority decision within the Council would be required for intervention, which would be aimed at restoration of the status quo and the resumption of peace talks within one calendar month of intervention.

how would NATO know if something was internal strife? who would 'announce' it...the Cy. government? Greece? Turkey? NATO itself? could this be abused by people for their own gains? Im not trying to rubbish the point, im just asking who would be able to decide if something should count as 'internal strife'?

[cannedmoose]

Considering that the Republic of Cyprus alone spends about US$400m a year on it's armed forces, if the same figure was spent on a force of 4,000 as I've proposed, the funding per soldier would be about US$100,000 per head, half that of the UK armed forces average, but still more than enough to pay, train and equip a highly effective professional soldier.

[cannedmoose]

Dhavlos wrote: this sounds like a really good idea, well thought out and i can not really see any problem with it.

the only question i would have is over point (e)

how would NATO know if something was internal strife? who would 'announce' it...the Cy. government? Greece? Turkey? NATO itself? could this be abused by people for their own gains? Im not trying to rubbish the point, im just asking who would be able to decide if something should count as 'internal strife'?

Obviously there would have to be a common agreement as to what would constitute 'internal strife', I'd need to think that through myself. On first thought, I would say that the North Atlantic Council would be the judge of this. However, as I said, it would require a majority vote within the NATO Council to enable NATO intervention, which would preclude an individual country, or even a small group within NATO from being able to 'invade', for want of a better term, on a whim.

[Dhavlos]

would it thus be fair to say the issue of a cypriot army has been solved???

[cannedmoose]

No, I think we need more perspectives on this... we may agree but others may see holes in this. I think one probable difficulty would be getting AKEL to sign up to any plan that involved NATO participation in the island's security... you know how they feel about Yankee imperialism.

Of course, the alternative, if the Europeans ever get their house in order would be full integration of Cyprus into ESDP, with European security mechanisms providing the same 'guarantee' as envisaged for NATO. This might assuage AKELs definite wrath against a NATO proposal.

[brother]

Sounds good moose but i do not really trust the EU yet when it comes to security as they have no real proven track record.

[cannedmoose]

You see Bro', that's where the disagreement would likely fall. Many Turkish Cypriots don't entirely trust the impartiality of the EU, whereas many Greek Cypriots don't trust NATOs impartiality either because of the strong US influence.

But in my opinion, I couldn't include a direct role either for Greece or Turkey in Cyprus' security because I think the opportunities for meddling would be too great and attractive. Whereas NATO, as an organisation including both Greece, Turkey and Cyprus would provide opportunities for things such as joint exercises between the three countries, on an equal basis... which might also somewhat defuse the tension between them in the region.

[Crash Test Dummy]

[quote="cannedmoose"]Considering that the Republic of Cyprus alone spends about US$400m a year on it's armed forces
where is this coming from??


CYP£239per cypriot person per year. (using the figure there are 780,133 cypriots july 2005 estimation from http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/2119rank.html)


seems quite high